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ABSTRACT
Fairness concerns about algorithmic decision-making systems have
been mainly focused on the outputs (e.g., the accuracy of a classifier
across individuals or groups). However, one may additionally be
concerned with fairness in the inputs. In this paper, we propose and
formulate two properties regarding the inputs of (features used by)
a classifier. In particular, we claim that fair privacy (whether individ-
uals are all asked to reveal the same information) and need-to-know
(whether users are only asked for the minimal information required
for the task at hand) are desirable properties of a decision system.
We explore the interaction between these properties and fairness in
the outputs (fair prediction accuracy). We show that for an optimal
classifier these three properties are in general incompatible, and we
explain what common properties of data make them incompatible.
Finally we provide an algorithm to verify if the trade-off between
the three properties exists in a given dataset, and use the algorithm
to show that this trade-off is common in real data.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As data-driven decision making systems are increasingly used in
modern society in ways that affect individual lives, concerns have
been raised about their ethical implications. In particular, recent
years have witnessed a fast-growing number of studies on fairness
in the decisions made by such systems, including works on devel-
oping notions to define, measures to quantify, and mechanism to
ensure fair outputs (i.e., whether a decision system provides an
equitable service to all of its users or groups of users). Despite the
natural dependence of decision outcomes on data inputs, fairness
concerns that incorporate the inputs of decision system are however
less studied.
Traditionally, ethical concerns about the inputs to (i.e., data used
by) decision systems have been the focus of “privacy” studies, while
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ethical concerns about the outputs from decision systems have been
the focus of “fairness” studies. However, we observe that privacy
and fairness originate from fundamentally different epistemic argu-
ments. At a high-level, privacy concerns are rooted in a desire to
protect individuals by limiting or enabling control over the infor-
mation they reveal to the world. Fairness concerns, on the other
hand, are rooted in a desire for equitable treatment of individuals
(or groups of individuals). As such, privacy and fairness concerns
can independently arise for both the inputs used and the outputs
generated by decision systems.
As a motivating example, consider a decision problem where
the goal is to decide whether an applicant should be offered a
loan. The decision for each applicant is made based on answers
that are collected to a number of demographic and financial status
questions. In settings similar to this example, we recognize certain
social concerns regarding the information that is gathered from
each applicant. In particular, we raise two questions motivated by
previous proposals and legal regulations:
First, considering each applicant individually, we ask “what in-
formation is necessary for (i.e., what questions are relevant to) solving
the decision problem at hand?” In the loan eligibility problem for
example, it seems unnecessary to ask about an applicant’s height.
Moreover, although it may often be necessary to ask about edu-
cation level, an applicant who has an excellent credit score and
a secure job may find a question about his education level to be
unnecessary. Notice that as revealing each piece of information to
the decision system is associated with a potential loss in privacy,
this concern is related to protecting individuals’ privacy.
The above consideration is reflected in the EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [37] as a principle called data min-
imization, which is defined as: “Personal data shall be adequate,
relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes
for which they are processed.”
The second ethical question arises when comparing the infor-
mation used (i.e., set of questions asked) from different applicants.
In particular, we ask “how can using different pieces of information
from different applicants amount to discrimination?” For instance,
a loan applicant may find it unfair that she is asked to answer a
different set of questions comparing to another applicant.
In order to study these questions in a concrete setting, we con-
sider a classifier and a set of input variables (features). We assume
that the classifier is trained using all the features, and we study
properties of the classifier when it is applied to a test set. Further-
more, we assume that the classifier is able to classify a given data
point using any subset of the input features. In other words, for a
given classification instance at the test time, the values of only a
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
09
20
9v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
9 M
ay
 20
20
UMAP ’20 Adjunct, July 14–17, 2020, Genoa, Italy Rastegarpanah et al.
subset of input features may be revealed to the classifier, and the
remaining feature values are set to unknown1.
We observe that in such scenarios, one may ask “What properties
can make the set of data inputs used for each classification instance
more socially desirable?” Our first contribution is proposing two
properties of classifiers regarding their inputs to address the above
question; namely the need-to-know principle and the fair privacy
principle. In the following we introduce each principle and their
formal definitions will be presented in section 4.
Notice that we are not concerned with how a set of feature values
are selected to be used for classifying each instance, but we are
rather interested in checking whether an arbitrary set of features
meets these properties2.
The need-to-know principle. This property presents one way
of formalizing “data minimization” [37] in a classification setting.
We propose a formulation that is based on classification accuracy.
Intuitively, the need-to-know principle requires that the decision
system use only the minimal amount of information that is necessary
for classifying a data point with a certain accuracy. This may for
example result in restricting the use of irrelevant or proxy features.
The justification for this principle is rooted in respecting the
privacy rights of individuals to not divulge information about them-
selves that is not needed for the task at hand. Such a consideration
is an important argument for emerging privacy regulations in dif-
ferent countries that require data aggregators to justify the need to
collect information about individuals [31, 37, 38].
The fair privacy principle. Intuitively, the fair privacy principle
requires that the decision system use the same information (i.e.,
data inputs) about all individuals when making decisions. Put dif-
ferently, the fair privacy principle prohibits a decision system from
using more or less or different pieces of information about differ-
ent individuals. The justification for the fair privacy principle is
two-fold:
First, we observe that in many scenarios it is preferable to use
the same data inputs for all individuals since it equalizes the oppor-
tunity to get beneficial outcomes. In the loan eligibility problem for
example, if a decision system uses different input features for two
different individuals say, Alice and Bob, Alice might wonder if she
might have been offered a loan had she been asked to provide the
same inputs as Bob, and vice versa.
We do not expect this argument to be desirable in every situa-
tion. For example, in the case of predicting recidivism rates, it may
seem reasonable to ask for more information from one individual
comparing to the others in order to achieve an accurate prediction.
However, in other domains such as recruiting, it is often considered
best practice for all candidates to be asked the same questions, i.e.,
provide the same data inputs. In fact such considerations have been
the main inspiration for structured interviews.
Second, note that one approach to achieve “equitable treatment
of individuals”— as the basic idea behind fairness— is equitable
1While we do not make additional assumptions about the classification algorithm,
practical examples of classification with partially known inputs are models that can
naturally handle different sets of input features (e.g. the naive Bayes), and a prediction
model in which unknown feature are estimated using some imputation procedure.
2In practice, one needs to specify how the features are selected (e.g., by using
methods that are suggested in [28, 41, 46, 48]). However, by studying these properties
and their interaction regardless of the feature selection procedure, we show inherent
trade-offs that cannot be avoided using any feature selection procedure.
protection of individuals against disclosure of their private data.
The authors in [16] suggest that a desirable property for a privacy
protection mechanism is to provide its protections equitably to
all its subjects. From this perspective, In decision scenarios where
individuals would prefer to not divulge their private data and there
is cost to revealing such data, it is preferable that all individuals
bear equal cost, and our fair privacy principle guarantees such an
equatable share of privacy costs.
Our running assumption in this paper is that the decision system
(classifier) itself is a privacy adversary. This assumption is consistent
with scenarios such as our loan application example. Thus we do
not consider privacy notions that assume an adversary who is
different from the party that collects and processes personal data
(e.g., differential privacy [14]).
The trade-off. Our second contribution lies in exposing the trade-
offs in simultaneously achieving the proposed fairness and privacy
considerations for inputs as well as previously proposed fairness
considerations for outputs. Specifically, after formalizing our pro-
posed principles of need-to-know and fair privacy, we show that in
general, an optimal classifier cannot simultaneously satisfy both
principles and achieve fairness in outputs (defined as equal pre-
diction accuracy for all individuals). We then provide a formal
specification of all datasets in which this trade-off exists, and a
practically efficient algorithm to verify whether a given dataset
presents the trade-off.
While each of need-to-know and fair privacy is a desirable prop-
erty by itself and it is natural to seek a classifier that satisfies both,
we further explain why achieving these two properties simultane-
ously is particularly interesting. Assume a classifier is applied to
solve our loan eligibility example. One may decide to achieve fair
privacy by asking all applicants to provide answers to all the input
features. While this trivial approach will satisfy fair privacy, we
observe that for all applicants whose prediction would not change
if using a subset of feature values, the need-to-know principle is
violated3.
Therefore, imposing need-to-know constraint can be seen as a
way to eliminate trivial solutions for achieving fair privacy. On
the other hand, using the same subset of input features for all the
applicants such that need-to-know is respected will affect the pre-
diction accuracy of those applicants for whom more data inputs are
required. Our incompatibility result in fact formalizes this intuitive
argument.
Finally, note that although optimal classifiers are rarely used in
practice, our results pose a new challenge to the design of classifiers
that aim at optimality: “how much one needs to compromise on
optimality in order to simultaneously achieve fairness in the inputs
and outputs of a classifier?”
2 RELATEDWORK
While some recent work has focused on both privacy and fairness
considerations for outputs [3, 11, 17, 22, 29], relatively little work
(e.g., [18]) has examined fairness considerations for inputs. In this
paper we introduce new notions that simultaneously capture both
3Another trivial solution is using a baseline classifier that does not use any
feature values from all applicant. Notice that this trivial classifier violates the adequacy
requirement of input data in the “data minimization” principle.
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privacy and fairness properties of inputs in algorithmic decision
systems, and explore their interaction with fairness properties of
outputs. In the following we review related work on different so-
cietal aspects of decision-making systems including privacy and
fairness.
Fairness in algorithmic decision-making. In recent years sev-
eral empirical studies have shown how algorithmic decision systems
are prone to unfair treatment of their users in different areas (e.g.,
online advertisement [44] and criminal justice [26]). For more ex-
amples we point the interested readers to survey papers [4, 39].
These findings have raised awareness about the importance of fair
decision-making systems by regulatory authorities as well [32, 37].
Research on fair classification can be divided into two parts: for-
mulating fairness nations and measures, and developing techniques
to improve the fairness of algorithmic systems. Fairness notions
can be categorized as those measuring group unfairness and those
measuring unfairness at the level of individuals [13, 42]. Fairness-
enhancing techniques in general fall into three categories based
on the stage of the classification pipeline that they are employed:
(i) pre-processing [6, 23], (ii) in-processing [1, 24, 50], and (iii) post-
processing [10, 21]. In this paper we take the accuracy equality [47]
approach to fairness in section 4.1, and we apply it at the individual
level as it has been done previously in [36, 42].
Privacy. Privacy in information systems is generally understood
using two concepts: limitation theory and control theory [45]. Using
those theories, several methods have been proposed to protect the
privacy of the users in practice such as differential privacy [14] k-
anonymity [2] and cryptography [43]. The definitions of fairness in
privacy that we put forward are concerned with which information
about a user is used by the classifier, and so relate most closely to
limitation theory.
Need-to-know as a privacy notion. Achieving complete privacy
has been the goal of cryptography approaches such as secure multi-
party computation (SMC). However, due to practical constraints
such as computational efficiency and auditing purposes, the alter-
native goal of acquiring minimum neccessary data has become
important as stated by regulations in different countries [31, 37, 38].
Our proposed need-to-know property follows the similar idea: the
system should use the minimum amount of information from users
to provide a certain level of quality of service. In a concurrent work
Biega et al. [5] define the need to know principle for computational
applications and tie it to concepts in data protection laws.
Cost-sensitive learning and privacy as cost. Our definitions of
fairness in privacy can be expressed in terms of a cost associated
with each feature. This follows a line of research in machine learn-
ing that focuses on settings in which acquiring feature values is
associated with some cost. The goal then is to make the best possible
prediction with minimum cost users incurred at the test time. Some
examples are decision trees with minimal cost [27], test-cost sen-
sitive Naive Bayes classification [8], and using a Markov decision
process to sequentially acquire feature values [28, 41, 46].
A number of previous papers have associated privacy more ex-
plicitly with a cost [15, 33]. Note however that while these works
consider privacy as feature costs, the general goal is that the privacy
loss of each individual is minimized; there is no consideration of
fairness of privacy.
Privacy and fairness.Recently both privacy and fairness researchers
have recognized the importance of understanding the interaction
between privacy and fairness in algorithmic decision systems [3, 11,
19, 22, 40]. However, as eloquently argued by Ekstrand et. al. [16],
much work remains to be done in “characterizing under what cir-
cumstances and definitions privacy and fairness are simultaneously
achievable?”. Our results in this paper can be seen as an effort to
answer this question by specifying some of the circumstances in
which the interaction between privacy and fairness can be formally
studied.
The authors in [16] also interpret fair privacy as whether a
privacy scheme protects all individuals equally, and they raise ques-
tions about the implications of this property on other fairness no-
tions; however their discussion remains at a high level.
From a practical viewpoint, some studies have proposed tech-
niques to improve fairness and privacy at the same time [19, 20, 40].
Furthermore, the authors in [34, 35] provide a framework for empir-
ical assessment of privacy risks associated with different individuals
when different subsets (dataviews) of a dataset are used. This frame-
work allows studying the trade-off between privacy risk and data
utility (which in turn is linked to accuracy). However, they do not
consider an explicit notion of fairness in privacy or in accuracy.
Differential Privacy and fairness. Another recent line of work
considers a common pivacy notion, differential privacy [14], and
studies its interaction with existing fairness notions. In particular
authors in [11] prove that differential privacy is incompatible with
satisfying equal false negative rates among groups, and they provide
a differentially private classification algorithm that approximately
satisfies group fairness guarantees with high probability. Further-
more, it has been shown that applying differential privacy implies
unequal accuracy costs over different subgrups which results in
decreasing fairness [3].
In this paper, instead of differential privacy, we use a privacy
notion that is based on the set of revealed features of users, which
allows us to compare the privacy loss of different users.
Incompatibility results. There are incompatibility results in the
area of fairness in machine learning [9, 25]; however, they all con-
sider different fairness measures defined for the output of a learning
system, e.g., the trade-off between calibration, equal false positive
rates, and equal false negative rates. In contrast, this paper intro-
duces a trade-off between fairness properties related to the outputs
and inputs of a classifier.
3 FORMULATION AND SETTING
We start by establishing notation and a number of definitions. We
consider a set of features F = { f1, . . . , fd } in which each feature fi
takes values from the domain Fi . A datasetD is a set of data points
(feature vectors) xi ∈ X where X = F1 × · · · × Fd together with the
corresponding labels yi ∈ Y, i.e., D ⊂ {(xi ,yi )|xi ∈ X,yi ∈ Y}.
For notational convenience, we useDX to denote the set of feature
vectors in D, i.e., DX = {xi |∃y ∈ Y s .t . (xi ,y) ∈ D}. For any
S ⊆ F and xi , ΩS (xi ) denotes feature vector xi in which only
values of the features in S are revealed.
Let X be a multivariate random variable that takes on values
x ∈ DX , and Y (X ) be a random variable that denotes the true label
of X inD. If no information about X is known, the probability that
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the label of X is c ∈ Y equals to4
Pr [Y (X ) = c] = |{(x,y) ∈ D|y = c}||D|
This probability changes if some features values in X are revealed.
In particular, given that ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi ) we have:
Pr [Y (X ) =c | ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi )] =
|{(x,y) ∈ D|ΩS (x) = ΩS (xi ) ∧ y = c}|
|{(x,y) ∈ D|ΩS (x) = ΩS (xi )}|
A classifier Yˆ is a function that predicts the label of a given feature
vector. We assume that Yˆ is trained on all the features in F , and at
the test time it is applied to data points in a datasetD. Furthermore,
We assume that Yˆ can make a prediction using any subset of the
feature values (see footnote 1). In particular, Yˆ (ΩS (xi )) denotes the
predicted label for xi by Yˆ using feature set S . We do not make
any assumption about Yˆ being a deterministic or a probabilistic
function.
Yˆ (X ) is a random variable that denotes the label predicted for
X by Yˆ ; similarly, Yˆ (ΩS (X )) is a random variable that denotes the
label predicted for X by the classifier Yˆ based on the features in S .
3.1 Predictive Power of a Feature Set
For a given dataset D, we define the predictive power ΦS (xi ) of a
feature set S ⊆ F for a data point xi ∈ DX , as the probability of
the most probable label for X given that the values of the features
in S are revealed by xi , i.e., ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi ). In other words,
ΦS (xi ) = max
c ∈Y
Pr [Y (X ) = c |ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi )]
If ΦS (xi ) = 1, we say that xi is distinguishable in D using feature
set S .
3.2 Optimal Classifier
We first define the accuracy of a classifier for a data point using a
subset of features.
Prediction Accuracy. The accuracy of the prediction Yˆ (ΩS (xi ))
is the probability that the label predicted for X using the features
in S is equal to the true label of X , given the feature values revealed
by ΩS (xi ). In other words,
acc(Yˆ (ΩS (xi ))) = Pr [Yˆ (ΩS (X )) = Y (X )|ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi )]. (1)
An optimal classifier is then defined as follows.
Optimal Classifier. Given a dataset D, an optimal classifier Yˆopt
is a classifier that for all data points in D and using any subset of
features S ⊆ F , has the highest prediction accuracy. In other words,
Yˆopt satisfies the following5
∀xi ∈ DX ,∀S ⊆ F ,∀Yˆ ; acc(Yˆ (ΩS (xi ))) ≤ acc(Yˆopt (ΩS (xi )))
The following lemma provides a convenient way for computing
the accuracy of the predictions made by an optimal classifier. In
particular, it states that for any data point in a given dataset, the
accuracy of an optimal classifier using a set of features can be
4In this paper we assume a finite sample model using the given dataset. Thus
our setting is an instance of transductive learning as opposed to inductive learning in
which the dataset is a sample from some distribution.
5This is an extension of the Bayes optimal classifier to the settings where any
subset of features can be used to make a prediction.
computed by finding the predictive power of that feature set for the
corresponding data point. We later use this result to measure the
performance of an optimal classifier by studying the characteristics
of the dataset to which the classifier is applied.
Lemma 1. A classifier is optimal for a given a dataset D, if and
only if for any ΩS (xi ) it returns the most probable label for X given
that ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi ).
The proof of lemma 1 is presented in appendix A.1.
Corollary 1. The prediction accuracy of an optimal classifier for
ΩS (xi ) is equal to the predictive power of set S for xi , i.e., ΦS (xi ).
4 DESIRED PROPERTIES
We now present formalizations of three properties that involve
privacy and fairness of classifiers. The properties that we define
in this section depend on both the input features used, and the
predictions made by a classifier. For a dataset D, we use Si ⊂ F to
denote the set of features used by a particular classifier to predict
the label of data point xi ∈ DX . Note that the following properties
can be validated for any arbitrary choice of Si for each data point.
We emphasize that here we are not concerned about how Si is
selected for a given data point and a particular classifier, but we are
rather concerned with the social properties of using Si compared
to other feature sets S ′i ⊂ F . (see footnote 2.)
4.1 Output Property: Fair Prediction Accuracy
In order to define a measure for the fairness in the outputs of a
classifier, we use the accuracy equality notion [47], and extend it
to the individual level as has been suggested in [42].
For a classifier Yˆ and a dataset D, let Si be the set of features
used to predict the label of xi . Yˆ satisfies fair prediction accuracy if
labels of all data points are predicted with equal accuracy, i.e.,
∃γ ∈ (0, 1] s .t . ∀xi ∈ DX , acc(Yˆ (ΩSi (xi ))) = γ (2)
4.2 Input Property: Need to Know
The need-to-know property states that for any data point, using any
proper subset of the features used by the classifier will decrease the
prediction accuracy (i.e., the feature set Si is minimal with respect
to the prediction accuracy):
∀xi ∈ DX ,∀S ′ ⊂ Si , acc(Yˆ (ΩS ′(xi ))) < acc(Yˆ (ΩSi (xi ))) (3)
Note that the need-to-know property does not imply that the
prediction accuracy must improve monotonically as the number
of features that are used by the classifier increases. Furthermore,
although we consider accuracy as the criterion for which the use
of data is minimized, other measures (e.g., false negative rate) may
be more appropriate in specific applications. We leave studying the
implications of such alternative definitions of need-to-know for
future work.
4.3 Input Property: Fair Privacy
Fair privacy is determined by the input features used by classifier
for each data point. We assume each feature is associated with a
non-negative cost that denotes the privacy cost of revealing that
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Table 1: An illustrative dataset.
features
data point f1 f2 label
x1 0 0 -
x2 0 1 -
x3 0 3 +
x4 2 3 -
Table 2: Predictive power of each feature set.
feature sets
data point Φ∅ Φ{f 1} Φ{f 2} Φ{f 1,f 2}
x1 3/4 2/3 1 1
x2 3/4 2/3 1 1
x3 3/4 2/3 1/2 1
x4 3/4 1 1/2 1
feature, and that the privacy cost of each feature is the same across
all users. Let vector c ∈ Rd≥0 denote the privacy costs of the features.
Fair privacy states that the total privacy costs of the used features
are equal for all data points, i.e.,
∃ℓ ∈ R s .t . ∀xi ∈ DX ,
∑
fk ∈Si
c(k) = ℓ (4)
There are at least two natural cases for the cost vector c:
Feature Count. One may choose to treat the privacy costs of all
features as equal. Setting c = c .1d implies that privacy fair-
ness holds when the number of used features is the same for
all data points, i.e.,
∃k ∈ N s .t . ∀xi ∈ DX , |Si | = k (5)
Feature Match. Another natural approach is to treat two feature
sets as equal-privacy-cost if and only if they contain the
same features. This can be formalized by making the total
cost of every subset of the features distinct (e.g. c = {2n |0 ≤
n ≤ d − 1}). In this case, privacy fairness means that the
exact same set of features are used to make a prediction for
all data points:
∃S ⊆ F s .t . ∀xi ∈ DX , Si = S (6)
5 THE TRADE-OFF
In this section we study how the different socially important prop-
erties of a classifier defined in Section 4 interact. In particular, since
all the three properties have important social values, it is natural to
ask whether they can be satisfied simultaneously. In other words,
we ask whether it is possible for a classifier to use a particular set of
input features for each test instance, and satisfy all three properties
while maximizing prediction accuracy.
First, we show that there are situations (i.e., datasets) in which
an optimal classifier cannot simultaneously satisfy fair privacy,
fair accuracy, and need-to-know. Then we present a theorem that
precisely characterizes all the datasets in which such a trade-off
exists under our definitions. This implies that in general, achieving
fairness in the inputs and the outputs of an optimal classifier are
incompatible goals.
5.1 Presenting the Incompatibility
We show that the following proposition is true:
Proposition 1. When applied to an arbitrary dataset, an optimal
classifier cannot be guaranteed to simultaneously satisfy fair privacy,
fair accuracy, and need-to-know, unless it is the trivial classifier that
does not use any feature values for all data points.
Proof.We provide an example of a dataset for which any optimal
classifier can satisfy at most two of fair privacy, fair accuracy, and
need-to-know. Table 1 presents our example dataset. The dataset
contains two features (f1 and f2), and four data points with class
labels y ∈ {+,−}. Figure 1 shows the data points in a 2D plane.
0 1 2 3
f1
0
1
2
3
f2
Figure 1
We present our arguments using two different feature cost vec-
tors; each corresponds to one of feature count and feature match
cases introduced in section 4.3.
Feature Count. Assume that privacy costs of all features are
1, i.e., c = 12. Using corollary (1), we know that the prediction
accuracy of an optimal classifier for each data point is equal to
the predictive power of the selected feature set for that data point.
Table 2 shows the predictive power of each subset of features for
each data point in the dataset.
First, assume an optimal classifier that satisfies fair privacy. Con-
sidering the given feature cost vector, the privacy cost for each data
point can be either 1 (the classifier uses either f1 or f2) or 2 (the
classifier uses both f1 and f2). (Notice that the case of using no
feature values for all data points is excluded from proposition1.)
Therefore, in order to satisfy fair privacy, the privacy cost of all
data points should be equal, and is either 1 or 2.
If the privacy cost is 1 for all data points (using either f1 or
f2), from Table 2 we observe that it is not possible to have equal
prediction accuracy for all data points. In particular, the prediction
accuracy for x3 is 23 using f1 and
1
2 using f2. However, there is no
way to have prediction accuracy of 23 for x4, or
1
2 for x1 and x2
using either f1 or f2. This violates fair prediction accuracy.
If the privacy cost is 2, all the labels can be predicted with ac-
curacy 1.0. However, this violates the need to know property for
data points x1, x2, x4 because the same prediction accuracy could
be reached using only f2 for x1 and x2, or using f1 for x4.
Therefore, any optimal classifier that satisfies fair privacy when
applied on this dataset violates either the fair prediction accuracy
or the need to know property. □
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Feature Match.We could get the same result by assuming fea-
ture costs such that the total cost of every feature subset is distinct.
In that case, fair privacy reduces to using the same set of features
for every data point. From Table 2, we observe that the only fea-
ture set that satisfies fair accuracy, i.e., the only column with equal
predictive power for all data points, is { f1, f2}; and using this set
violates need-to-know for x1, x2, x4.
5.2 Formal Specification
The previous section presents a dataset for which at most two of
the properties from Section 4 can be satisfied. However, it remains
to formalize when precisely a given dataset exhibits the trade-off,
which we do in this section. We do this for an optimal classifier
under the Feature Match definition of fair privacy (eq.6) and we
leave generalizing to other definitions of fair privacy for future
work. In the common case where privacy costs of the features are
unknown, the Feature Match definition— i.e., using the same set of
features for all individuals— is a reasonable choice.
Similar to the previous section, in the following we exclude the
trivial classifier that does not use any feature values for all data
points.
Theorem 1. There exists an optimal non-trivial classifier that
satisfies fair privacy, fair accuracy, and need-to-know when applied
to a dataset D, if and only if D satisfies the following condition:
∃ “non-empty S” ⊆ F s .t .,
∃γ ∈ (0, 1] s .t . ∀xi ∈ DX , ΦS (xi ) = γ
∧
∀xi ∈ DX ,∀S ′ ⊂ S, ΦS ′(xi ) < ΦS (xi )
(7)
The proof of theorem 1 is presented in appendix A.2.
Theorem 1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition (eq.7) to
identify datasets for which an optimal classifier can simultaneously
satisfy all the three properties. Notice that this condition is an
statement about a dataset and can be verified independently of any
classifier. The statement can be written as the following description
of a dataset:
“There is a non-empty feature set that has equal predictive power
for all data points in the dataset. Furthermore, all subsets of that
feature set have lower predictive power for all points in the dataset.”
Consequently, the negation of (7) provides a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the case where any optimal classifier can satisfy
at most two of fair prediction accuracy, fair privacy, and need to
know (i.e., datasets in which there is a trade-off between the above-
mentioned properties of any optimal classifier). By negating (7) we
find the following characterization of such datasets:
∀ “non-empty S” ⊆F ,
∃xi , xj ∈ DX s .t . ΦS (xi ) , ΦS (xj )
∨
∃xi ∈ DX ,∃S ′ ⊂ S s .t . ΦS ′(xi ) ≥ ΦS (xi )
(8)
For an intuitive interpretation of the above statement, assume
an optimal classifier that satisfies fair privacy, i.e., set S is used
for all data points in the dataset. Therefore, in order to exhibit the
trade-off, using S the classifier should either violate fair prediction
accuracy (first clause in (8)), or need-to-know (second clause in (8)).
Thus, showing that for all non-empty S ⊆ F either fair prediction
accuracy or need-to-know are violated implies that no optimal
non-trivial classifier can satisfy all three properties.
Corollary 2. Given a data set D and a non-trivial classifier
Yˆ , if D satisfies (8) and Yˆ satisfies fair privacy, fair accuracy, and
need-to-know when applied to D, then Yˆ is not optimal 6.
6 THE TRADE-OFF IN REAL DATA
Given the results in the previous section, it is worthwhile to ask
whether this trade-off is typical – does it occur often in real-world
data? We first develop a practical approach to answering this ques-
tion for a given dataset, and then we apply our approach to various
datasets from the standard UCI machine learning repository [12].
Algorithm 1: verify if a given dataset holds the trade-off be-
tween fair accuary, fair privacy, and need-to-know properties
for an optimal classifier.
Input: Dataset D with feature set F
Output: Yes/No
1 initialize queue Q
2 C = [ ]
3 Q.put({})
4 for f in F do
5 if f has identical value over all data points then
6 remove f from F
7 while Q is not empty do
8 S = Q.get()
9 if S , ∅ then
10 C.append(S)
11 compute ΦS (xi ) for all xi ∈ D
12 if ΦS (xi ) , 1 for all xi ∈ D then
13 for all features f in F whose index is larger than the largest
index in S do
14 Q.put(S ∪{f })
15 for candidate S in C do
16 if S satisfies the 1st clause in (8) then
17 continue
18 if S satisfies the 2nd clause in (8) then
19 continue
20 else
21 return No
22 return Yes
6.1 A Verification Algorithm
For any given dataset, we may apply (8) to test it, since (8) is a
predicate that identifies all and only those datasets for which the
trade-off is present. A naive approach to evaluating (8) consists of
computing ΦSk (xi ) for all subsets Sk ⊆ F and all xi ∈ D. If for
each Sk at least one of the two clauses in (8) are satisfied, no opti-
mal classifier can simultaneously satisfy fair accuracy, fair privacy,
6An example of such a non-optimal classifier is provided in appendix B.
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and need-to-know when applied on D. However, the universal
quantifier in (8) implies a search over the exponential number of
subsets in the power set of F . Hence, we must consider how to
efficiently verify that a given dataset satisfies (8). In this section, we
introduce a verification algorithm that exploits several structures
in the feature susbsets to prune the search space and is efficient in
practice.
The pseudocode of our dataset verification algorithm is provided
in algorithm 1. The algorithm first generates feature subsets (candi-
dates) for which an optimal classifier could possibly satisfy both fair
accuracy and need-to-know. Then it eliminates each candidate that
satisfies at least one of the two clauses in (8). The algorithm uses an
incremental method to generate candidates (i.e., larger sets are gen-
erated by adding more features to each of the existing candidates.)
This allows the algorithm to recognize many of the candidates that
will satisfy (8) before actually generating them. This is a key tool
for pruning the search space and obtaining a practical algorithm.
The first pruning step is to notice that if a feature fi has identical
values for all data points, removing fi from a feature subset S does
not change the predictive power of that feature subset. That is,
ΦS (xi ) = ΦS\fi (xi ) for all xi ∈ D. Therefore, any feature subset
that contains fi violates need-to-know. Consequently, we do not
use such features in our candidate generation procedure (lines 4-6).
The second pruning step is to notice that if ΦSk (xi ) = 1 for some
Sk ⊆ F and some xi , then any superset S∗k of Sk violates need to
know property (i.e., second clause of (8)). This is because predictive
power cannot be larger than 1. Therefore, we can prune from our
search space all the supersets of any feature set whose predictive
power is 1 for at least one data point. As we generate new subsets,
we compute the predictive power of each subset for all data points,
and we stop adding more features to that subset once a data point
is distinguishable in the dataset using that subset (lines 7-14).
Finally, for each generated feature subset we first verify the first
clause of (8); if it is not satisfied we verify the second clause (lines
15-21). Notice that the time complexity of verifying the first clause
is linear in the size of the feature subset while the complexity of
verifying the second clause is exponential in the size of the feature
subset. If all the candidates (generated feature subsets) satisfy at
least one of the two clauses in (8), we conclude that the given dataset
holds our desired trade-off, i.e., an optimal classifier can satisfy at
most two of fair accuracy, fair privacy, and need to know properties
for the given dataset.
6.2 Verifying Real Data
Using Algorithm 1, we find that it is possible to test reasonable-
sized datasets and determine whether they exhibit the trade-off. We
obtain 18 datasets which have discrete feature domains from the
UCI machine learning repository [12], and apply our verification
algorithm to check if the trade-offs introduced in section 5 exist in
each dataset. Table 4 in appendix C summarizes the datasets and
the performance of the verification algorithm for each dataset.
We observe that the size of the largest generated candidate for
most of the datasets is significantly smaller than the number of
features in that dataset, which shows that the superset pruning
procedure is effective. The verification algorithm terminates in less
than a minute for all cases even though a complete search over the
power set of the features would be infeasible in most cases. Also
notice that except in one case (Nursery dataset), only verifying the
first clause of (8) is enough for all data points.
Our algorithm verifies that every dataset we examined exhibits
the trade-off between the three properties— hinting that the trade-
off is prevalent in real-world data with discrete feature domains.
7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we argue that the fairness notions for algorithmic
decision-making systems should expand to incorporate the inputs
(i.e., features) used by a system, and we formulate two of such input
properties: fair privacy and need-to-know.
We prove that in general an optimal classifier cannot satisfy all
of fair privacy, need-to-know, and fair accuracy. Furthermore, we
characterize all the datasets inwhich the above trade-off exists using
logical predicates. Finally, we provide an algorithm that exploits
several computational efficiencies to verify if the trade-off is present
in a given dataset.
Figure 2
The tetrahedron in Figure 2 can be used to summarize our results.
In particular, the properties at any three vertices are satisfiable, but
all four can not be satisfied in general. We believe that each vertex
offers a potentially interesting direction for future exploration.
First, if one sets aside optimality to achieve the three socially de-
sirable properties, the question arises then how close to optimal can
the performance of such a fair-input and and fair-output classifier
be on a given dataset.
Second, if one instead sets aside fair privacy, one may seek to
achieve the other goals, perhaps following in the general style taken
in [30], i.e., using different input features from different individuals.
Third, one may rather choose to set aside need-to-know. For
example, the authors in [7] equalize false positive, false negative,
false discovery, and false omission rates across the protected groups
by deferring on some decisions (i.e., avoid making a decision for
some individuals). However, deferred decisions violate our need-to-
know principle which requires the system to only use data inputs
that are necessary for improving its predictions.
Finally, one may set aside fair accuracy, perhaps in favor of
weaker conditions such as fair mistreatment [7, 49]. In that case,
the question remains open whether other properties are achievable.
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A PROOFS
A.1 Lemma 1
We write the right hand side of (1) as:∑
c ∈Y
Pr [Yˆ (ΩS (X )) = c,Y (X ) = c |ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi )] (9)
Since Yˆ (ΩS (X )) only depends on the values of the features in S ,
Yˆ (ΩS (X )) and Y (X ) are conditionally independent given a set of
fixed values ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi ). Therefore (9) is equal to:∑
c ∈Y
Pr [Yˆ (ΩS (X )) = c |ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi )]Pr [Y (X ) = c |ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi )]
(10)
For any ΩS (xi ), let pc = Pr [Y (X ) = c |ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi )] and
p∗ = max
c ∈Y
pc . Also let pˆc = Pr [Yˆ (ΩS (X )) = c |ΩS (X ) = ΩS (xi )] for
an arbitrary classifier Yˆ . Using (10) we can write the following for
any classifier Yˆ :
acc(Yˆ (ΩS (xi ))) =
∑
c ∈Y
pc pˆc ≤
∑
c ∈Y
p∗pˆc = p∗
Therefore, p∗ is an upper bound for the prediction accuracy of any
classifier applied onΩS (xi ). Now let c∗ = argmax
c ∈Y
pc , the prediction
accuracy of a classifier that deterministically returns c∗ for ΩS (xi )
(i.e., pˆc = 0 for all c , c∗, and pˆc∗ = 1) isp∗; therefore, such classifier
is optimal.
Finally, we show that the prediction accuracy of any classifier
with pˆc∗ < 1 is lower than p∗. Assume a classifier Yˆ ′ for which
pˆc∗ = 1 − ϵ and pˆc ′ = ϵ for some ϵ > 0 and some c ′ ∈ Y such that
pc ′ < p∗. Thus,
acc(Yˆ ′(ΩS (xi ))) = p∗(1 − ϵ) + pc ′ϵ = p∗ + ϵ(pc ′ − p∗) < p∗ □
A.2 Theorem 1
For a classifier Yˆ applied to a dataset D, let Si denote the set of
features used from xi . First we repeat and name the following
definitions from section 4,
Fair Accuracy (p1):
∃γ ∈ (0, 1] s .t . ∀xi ∈ DX , acc(Yˆ (ΩSi (xi ))) = γ
Fair Privacy (p2):
∃S ⊆ F s .t . ∀xi ∈ DX , Si = S
Need-To-Know (p3):
∀xi ∈ DX ,∀S ′ ⊂ Si , acc(Yˆ (ΩS ′(xi ))) < acc(Yˆ (ΩSi (xi )))
Let Hopt be the set of all optimal non-trivial classifiers for D.
Assume there exists an optimal non-trivial classifier that satisfies
all of p1, p2, and p3 when applied onD, i.e., the following statement
is true:
∃Yˆ ∈ Hopt s .t . p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3 (11)
From p2we infer that the same set of features is used by the classifier
to predict the label of all the data points. We call this set S and we
replace Si with S in p1 and p3 (S is non-empty since Yˆ is non-trivial).
Moreover, since Yˆ is an optimal classifier, by Corollary (1) we can
replace the prediction accuracy of Yˆ for any data point and any
feature set with the predictive power of that feature set for that
data point. Thus, from (11) we infer that the following statement is
true:
∃ “non-empty S” ⊆ F s .t .,
∃γ ∈ (0, 1] s .t . ∀xi ∈ DX , ΦS (xi ) = γ
∧
∀xi ∈ DX ,∀S ′ ⊂ S, ΦS ′(xi ) < ΦS (xi )
(12)
On the other hand, assume we are given a dataset for which state-
ment (12) is true. We can then define a classifier Yˆ such that it uses
the features in S for all xi ∈ D, and it returns argmax
c ∈Y
Pr [Y (X ) =
c |ΩSk (X ) = ΩSk (xi )] for any Sk ⊆ F and xi ∈ D, i.e., Yˆ is optimal.
Therefore, acc(Yˆ (ΩSk (xi ))) = ΦSk (xi ) and from (12) we infer that Yˆ
satisfies p1 and p3. Furthermore, Yˆ satisfies p2 because it uses S for
all data points, and is optimal by definition. Therefore, statement
(11) is satisfied for D.
Thus the property defined in (12) is a necessary and sufficient
condition to recognize datasets for which there exists an optimal
classifier that satisfies all properties p1, p2, and p3. □
B A NON-OPTIMAL CLASSIFIER THAT
SATISFIES ALL THE THREE PROPERTIES
As we discussed in Section 7, one may give up optimality in order to
achieve a classifier that simultaneously satisfies all the three prop-
erties defined in Section 4. In this section, we present an example
of such a non-optimal classifier for the dataset in Table 1.
We use a probabilistic classifier for our discussion. Let x. fi denote
the value of feature fi in data point x. Now consider the classifier
defined by equation (13). This classifier first selects a linear classifier
based on the set of known feature values S . Then it returns a binary
label using an additional randomization step.
Yˆ (ΩS (x)) =

S = { f1, f2}
{
x. f2 − x. f1 ≥ 2 + w .p. 45
otherwise − w .p. 45
S = { f1}
{
x. f1 ≥ 1 − w .p. 34
otherwise + w .p. 34
S = { f2}
{
x. f1 ≥ 2 + w .p. 34
otherwise − w .p. 34
S = ∅
{
+ w .p. 12
− w .p. 12
(13)
Table 3 shows the accuracies of the predictions made by this
classifier for each data point and each feature set. The values in the
table are calculated using equation (1). First observe that by using
feature set { f1, f2} for all the data points, the classifier satisfies
fair privacy. Furthermore, the accuracy of the classifier for all data
points using this feature set is 45 , meaning that fair accuracy is also
satisfied. Finally, we observe that using any subset of { f1, f2} will
result in a lower prediction accuracy for all the data points in the
dataset, thus the need-to-know principle is also satisfied.
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Table 3: Accuracies of the predictions made by the classifier
in equation (13).
∅ { f 1} { f 2} { f 1, f 2}
x1 1/2 5/12 3/4 4/5
x2 1/2 5/12 3/4 4/5
x3 1/2 5/12 1/2 4/5
x4 1/2 3/4 1/2 4/5
In order to see that the classifier defined by equation (13) is not
optimal, notice that our optimality definition requires the classifier
to be optimal for all data points and using any subset S ⊂ F . How-
ever, using { f1, f2} we see that the accuracy of the classifier for all
the data points is 45 while all the data points are distinguishable us-
ing { f1, f2}, i.e., the accuracy of an optimal classifier using { f1, f2}
is 1 for all data points in the dataset.
This example illustrates an interesting direction for future re-
search, which can be stated as the following question: “how much
one needs to compromise on optimality in order to simultaneously
achieve all the three socially desirable properties introduced in this
paper?”
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C DATASET VERFIFICATION RESUTLS
Table 4: The results of applying our verification algorithm
to 18 UCI datasets.
Dataset size # features # labels
largest
candidate size
all candidates satisfy
the 1st condition
both 1st and 2nd
conditions were verified trade-off
Handwritten Digits 1797 64 10 4 ! ✘ YES
Haberman’s Survival 306 3 2 2 ! ✘ YES
Letter Recognition 20000 16 26 2 ! ✘ YES
Somerville Happiness 143 6 2 2 ! ✘ YES
Vehicle Silhouettes 846 18 4 2 ! ✘ YES
Caesarian 80 5 2 3 ! ✘ YES
Musk (Version 1) 476 166 2 1 ! ✘ YES
Musk (Version 2) 6598 166 2 1 ! ✘ YES
Optical Digits 3823 64 10 2 ! ✘ YES
Pen-Based Digits 7494 16 10 2 ! ✘ YES
Mushroom 5644 22 2 3 ! ✘ YES
Nursery 12960 8 5 8 ✘ ! YES
Census Income 32561 14 2 3 ! ✘ YES
Chess 28056 6 18 5 ! ✘ YES
Contraceptive Method 1473 9 3 4 ! ✘ YES
Balance Scale 625 4 3 3 ! ✘ YES
Breast Cancer 277 9 2 4 ! ✘ YES
Car Evaluation 1728 6 4 4 ! ✘ YES
